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Dawson: Some Modern Procedural Developments

SOME MODERN PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTSO
WmiLAM W. DAWSON 00
There is nothing startling about the subject of my address; it
probably has been the subject of addresses at similar gatherings
for at least a century. The matter which I shall discuss has been
discussed many times. If there is anything new in what I shall
say, it will be solely in my approach to the subject.
I have always liked to visit expositions, and this summer I have
had a-veritable orgy; I have seen two world's fairs. I have enjoyed
the exhibitions of art; I have listened to propaganda of all sorts;
I have seen marvelous machines and have wondered at lighting
effects. What has interested me most is the glimpse into the future
that has been given by great experimental laboratories. All that I
have seen has been material, however. I have seen no exhibitions
from any laboratories of social science. I have seen no attempt to
explain how those of us who are responsible for development in this
field are looking into the future and are to make our technique
responsive to the demands of the future. That there is such development all of us know. To see it, however, one must take a long
view. In the courtroom we always act as if our law were like that
of the Medes and the Persians which knoweth no change. Our
technique seems to require us to treat the law as fixed and certain.
Legal history teaches us, however, that the law is never static, but
is continually changing and expanding to meet the needs of
changing and expanding life. There are always those who try to
prevent this change, but they can only act as a drag; they do not
really stop the progress of the law.
In 1215 such an attempt was made in the Provisions of Oxford
by prohibiting new writs. By the use of these writs the jurisdiction
of the King's court had been rapidly expanding, new relief was
being afforded, and all this was to be stopped by an act of
parliament. But the demands of life were too strong, and in 1285
came the statute of Westminster II. This, you will recall, was one
of the statutes which did not seem to be revolutionary but from
which most of our modern law springs. In one section the act provided that new writs could be issued in consimili casu. This simple
phrase permitted the development of the actions of trespass on the
* Address delivered at the fifty-fifth meeting of the West Virginia Bar
Association at Clarksburg, West Virginiaon September 29-30, 1939.
** Professor of Law, Western Reserve Law School, Cleveland, Ohio.
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case and assumpsit which formed the legal basis for our current
practice in personal injury and contract. It was an event of great
potentiality, and new causes of action were born.
I think it is possible to see matters of similar significance today.
It seems to me that we may catch a glimpse of the law of the future
just as we may see the city of the future as science and engineering
reveals it to us. I see in the declaratory judgment, so widely
adopted, a development as significant as the Statute of Westminister II. This subject has been ably presented to you on previous occasions,' and I have the temerity to discuss it again only because of its very great importance. As I look into the future, I
can see that we shall be trying a large proportion of our cases as
actions for declaratory judgments.
I know of no reform in the law that has spread so rapidly, except perhaps code pleading in the latter half of the last century.
The reason for this growth is apparent when we consider the potency of the factors that have contributed to it. These have been
stated to be (1) the growth of modern industry and commerce;
(2) the increasing complexity of social and economic relations; (3)
the interference of the state in ever greater degree with private
enterprise, and (4) the rapidity of changes in political and economic conditions. 2 All of these factors forced upon the courts new
situations and problems for the solution of which the older remedies
were not adequate. Many of these situations represented not accomplished wrongs but rather disturbed social and economic relations. The parties, because of these disturbed conditions, were in
a position of peril and insecurity. They were unable to determine
their rights and privileges and hence unable to plan for the future.
It is relief from this condition that the declaratory judgment
is designed to supply. The definition of the declaratory judgment
is not set forth in the act, which grants power to the courts to "declare rights, status, and other legal relations". Professor Borchard
has given a comprehensive definition: "A declaratory judgment is
an affirmation by the societal agent of the state of the legal consequences attending a proved or admitted state of facts. It is the
determination or sentence of the law that a legal relation does or
xMadden, Declaratory Judgments (1922) W. VA. BAiz ASSIN RE.P. 231;
Jackson, A Proposal for Declaratory Judgment Procedure (1938) 45 W. VA. L.

Q.31.

2 Borchard, DeclaratoryJudgments (1933) 7 TULANE L,REV.183,
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does not exist." 3 It is to be noted that this definition includes only
the judgment itself. The declaratory judgment is a procedural
outcome of a civil action for such a judgment, just as a money
judgment is the outcome of an action of assumpsit on a promissory
note. Hence we may properly say that' the uniform declaratory
judgment act has provided us with a new cause of action.
The development of a new cause of action is an event of tremendous importance in the law; it means that a new situation is
recognized as a proper-subject of judicial relief. It is not a thing
to be feared; it is rather to be expected in a living law. In an old
case Lord Holt disposed of the objection that is so often made when
a new cause of action is presented to a court: "And it is no objection to say that it will occasion multiplicity of actions; 4for if
men will multiply injuries, actions must be multiplied too."
To include this new cause of action in our judicial armory may
require us to adopt more comprehensive concepts. It is difficult
to define a cause of action. We use the term every day; we draw
petitions stating causes of action, and we demur to those same
petitions. We tell clients with regret that they have no cause of
action. Many lawyers pass on the question solely by a process of
analogy; the facts presented are like a reported set of facts that
were held to constitute a cause of action. The difficulty with such
a process is that it does not permit recognition of a new cause of
action. Many lawyers will say that a cause of action consists of a
right on the part of the plaintiff and a corresponding wrong on
the part of the defendant. For such a definition there is distinguished authority. Professor MeCaskill defines a cause of action as follows: "It is that group of operative facts, which standing alone, would show a single right in the plaintiff and a single
delict to that right giving cause for the state, through its courts, to
afford relief to the party or parties whose right was invaded.''
This idea of the cause of action may be called the delictual theory.
It is in accord with the formulary system of classical common law
pleading. It will serve in modern personal injury cases and in
most collection cases. Where, however, is the delict in an action
for reformation, or an action to construe a will, or an action for
partition?
S Borehard, Judicial Belief for Peril and Insecurity (1932) 45 11Azv. L. REv.
797.
4 Ashley v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 90 Eng. Rep. R. 1188 (1703).
.MeCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 614, 638.

Cf. OHIO GEN. CODE (Page, 1938)

§

11237.
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Judge Phillips presented a different concept when he said:
"Primarily, an action is not 'for the redress or prevention of a
wrong'; it is a proceeding to protect a right. The basis of every
action is a right in the plaintiff; and the purpose of the action is,
primarily, to preserve such right."
Dean Clark has modernized and broadened Judge Phillips'
definition. He says: "The cause of action under the code should
be viewed as an aggregate of operative facts which give rise to one
or more relations of right-duty between two or more persons."-The action for a declaratory judgment is an aggregate of operative
facts giving rise to right-duty relations between the parties. It
indicates that these relations are in dispute; that the plaintiff is
thereby in a position of peril and insecurity and he asks that relief
be given him by declaring his rights and removing doubt before
disaster has occurred. Even this definition is not satisfactory and
perhaps we should discard the term as has been done in the federal
rules.
Closely connected with the question of the cause of action is
the question of judicial power. So deeply rooted is the old concept of the cause of action that there has sprung from it, as a
corollary, the idea that a court can only redress a wrong; that it
must punish the defendant who has committed the wrong, or must
assess damages against him, or enjoin him from doing this or that.
Unless action of this sort was demanded of the court, the courts in
the past have many times said that no justiciable matter was presented ta them; that there was nothing upon which a court might
operate. The Supreme Court of the United States has projected
this theory in many cases. Mr. Justice Holmes had this idea in
mind when he said: "The foundation of jurisdiction is physical
power, although in civilized times it is not necessary to maintain
that power throughout proceedings properly begun." s
The action for a declaratory judgment has sometimes been
banned from the courts on the ground that such actions were not
within the power of the courts. MNr. Justice Sanford said: " . . .
the judicial power . . . extends only to 'cases' and 'controversies'
in which the claims of litigants are brought before them for the
determination by such regular proceedings as are established for
the protection and enforcement of rights, or the prevention, re§ 31, note 2.
Clark, The Code Cause of Acion (1924) 33 YALE L. J. 817, 837.
a McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90, 37 S. Ct. 343, 61 L. Ed. 608 (1917).
@PHILLIPS, CODE PLEADING (1896)
7
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dress, or punishment of wrongs; and that their jurisdiction is
limited to cases and controversies in such form, with adverse
litigants, that the judicial power is capable of acting upon them,
and pronouncing and carrying into effect a judgment between the
parties, and does not extend to the determination of abstract questions or issues framed for the purpose of invoking the advice of
the court without real parties or a real case.""
It is true of course that a court must have a controversy before
it; it must have a real question, otherwise it would waste time in
deciding moot cases. Such a controversy may exist, however, without being in the form of the classical common law actions. The
Supreme Court, in the case cited, says in effect that the question
set forth cannot be a case because it is not within the prescribed
forms. An actual controversy is necessary, not as a sine qua non
of judicial power, but because our judicial technique requires ad.
versary proceedings. Our theory is that truth can be more easily
gleaned from the clash of adversaries.
The latest pronouncement of the United States Supreme Court
is a frank admission that the action for a declaratory judgment is
a case even though it does not follow traditional form.1'
The United States Supreme Court has admitted that while
ordinary
course of judicial procedure results in a judgment
the
requiring an award of process or execution to carry it into effect,
such relief is not an indispensable adjunct to the exercise of the
judicial function.'1 The display of force is quite unnecessary to
give effect to a decision. Professor Sunderland, the author of the
first American article on declaratory judgments, has expressed this
concept as follows:
"In early times the basis of jurisdiction is the existence
and the constant assertion of physical power over the parties
to the action, but as civilization advances the mere existence
of such power tends to make its exercise less and less essential.
"If this is true, it must be because there is something in
civilization itself which diminishes the necessity for a resort
to actual force in sustaining the judgment of courts. And it
is quite clear that civilization does supply an element which
is theoretically capable of entirely supplanting the exercise of
force in the assertion of jurisdiction. This is respect for law.
9Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U. S. 70, 74, 47 S. Ct. 282, 71 L. Ed.
541 (1927).
10 Nashville, etc. Ry v. Wallace, 288 'U. S. 249, 53 S. Ct. 345, 77 L. Ed. 730
(1933).
"I Fidelity National Bank v. Swope, 274 U. S. 123, 47 S. Ct. 511, 71 L. Ed.
959 (1927).
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If the parties to the action desire to obey the law, a mere determination by the court of their reciprocal rights and duties
is enough. No sheriff with his writ of injunction or execution
need shake the mailed fist of the State in the faces of the
litigants. The judgment of the court merely directs the will
of the parties, and the performance of duty becomes the automatic consequence of the declaration of right.
"It is not to be assumed that the peaceful acquiescence of
the highly civilized man in the legal findings of the court implies any loss of power in the court itself. Quite the contrary.
The greater the ease with which the court's findings impose
themselves on litigants, the more the real power of the court is
demonstrated. But the force behind the finding of the court
has become a latent instead of an active force. This transition
is possible, however, only when the existence of the force is so
well recognized and so clearly understood that no one would
think it worth while to put it to the test. The entire cessation
of actual coercive measures on the part of the court would
therefore mark, not the disappearance, but the perfection of
the rule of force.'12
The supreme court of Ohio has discussed the essentials of a
judgment and has said nothing of the coercive power.
"The essentials of a judgment are that it should on its
face appear to be the sentence or adjudication of a court or
judicial tribunal, and to constitute the judicial act of the court.
The judgment must be rendered in an existing action and must
decide an issue either of law or of fact. A judgment upon an
issue of pccuniary liability performs its main function when
it adjudicates the existence or nonexistence of the liability
sought to be established. A judgment also should be certain
and definite and should state the time of its rendition, the
parties, the matter in dispute, and the result of the action,
with the relief granted. All of these essentials exist in this
order for the payment of costs."13
A declaratory judgment fits into this concept since it adjudicates
the existence or nonexistence of liability.
This new cause of action will be widely used in the future in
widely different types of cases. We already have many cases indicating how great the utility of this device really is. In most
controversies regarding ordinary commercial contracts there is a
point where the parties have defined the issues involved but differ
as to meaning or legal effect. At that point counsel is consulted
12 Sunderland, A Modern Evolution in Remedial Bights' - The Declaratory
Judgment (1917) 16 MICH. L. Rzv. 69.
23 Symons v. Eichelberger, 110 Ohio St. 224, 236, 144 X. E. 279 (1924).
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by each party. If counsel agree, the controversy generally ends.
If there is no agreement and no settlement effected, then each
party acts upon the advice of his counsel, economic and sometimes
social relations are severed, and a breach ensues. Under the
declaratory judgment procedure this last fatal step may be avoided,
rights determined, uncertainty removed and business relationships
14
resumed.
The declaration may be in a negative form; the plaintiff desiring to free himself from liability may seek a declaration that
he owes no duty to the defendant. Cases of this type have occasioned some concern to the courts since the plaintiff would have
been a defendant under the older forms of action. This question
was presented to the English courts in the famous case of Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Hannay & Co." The plaintiff had purchased a bill
of exchange, with bill of lading attached, drawn on the defendant,
an English company. The draft was accepted and paid at the
plaintiff's London office. Subsequently it was discovered that the
bill of lading was forged, and Hannay & Company demanded the
return of their money. Upon refusal they sued the Guaranty Trust
Company in New York. It was agreed in that case that the law
of England applied. The trust company therefore brought an
action for declaratory judgment in the English courts, asking for
a declaration that they, by presenting the draft, had not guaranteed
the genuineness of the bill of lading, and were not bound to repay.
The court had some difficulty in finding a cause of action in the
plaintiff but they granted the declaration. We can see now that
the action consisted in relief from an unjust claim, a new cause of
action.
We are familiar with the attitude of courts of equity toward
restrictions on the use of land in deed or long-term contracts. Such
restrictions will be enforced at the request of the beneficiary and
the court will determine whether they are still binding. But
equity offers no relief to the burdened party. This situation has
been described as requiring the burdened party "to be hazardously
active in the breach of such restrictions and passive in litigation.-1'I
In hess v. Country Club Park," the plaintiff was the owner
of a lot which was restricted to residence purposes but was within
the business zone as determined by municipal ordinance. He de14 Herrlein v. Tocchini, 128 Cal. App. 612, 18 P. (2d) 73 (1933).
15 (1915) 2 K. B. 536.
16 Schenk, J., in Strong v. Hancock, 201 Cal. 530, 258 Pac. 60 (1927).
17213 Cal. 613, 2 P. (2d) 782 (1932).
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sired to construct a commercial building on the premises. He
sought and obtained a declaration that because of a change in the
condition of the surrounding premises the restrictive covenants in
his deed were no longer binding. He joined as defendants the
original grantor, who had created the restriction, and the owners
of adjacent lots.
In leases, particularly those running for long terms, perilous
situations frequently arise. The lessor may force the tenant to
leave for some alleged violation and then find himself sued for
damages. The tenant may claim some privilege and find that by
the assertion of a mistaken right he has forfeited the lease. These
questions may all be judicially determined by the declaratory
18
judgment, and the party relieved from peril and uncertainty.
The action for a declaratory judgment does not supplant the
action to construe a will; nor does it do away with equitable jurisdiction to construe a trust within the jurisdiction of a chancery
court. The new procedure does, however, offer an alternative
remedy which is often easier to apply.19
It may be that we proceed from status to contract as Mr. Maine
suggests, but nevertheless there are many questions of rights,
privileges and duties in the law to be determined by status. Perhaps the field will be enlarged in the future and even college professors will be held to have a status. That this field is growing there
can be no doubt, but at the present time most of the cases involve
20
domestic relations.
With the increase of governmental regulation of business it is
necessary to increase our remedies for governmental aggression.
This involves the whole field of judicial control of administrative
action. The leading English case in this field deserves our attention, because administrative law has developed further there than
we have dared to go even in recent years. Dyson v. AttorneyGeneral2' arises out of facts which have a familiar sound. The
plaintiff was a landowner and there was delivered to him "Form
IV" issued by the commissioners of inland revenue and requiring,
under penalty of fine, detailed information to be filed in regard to
the plaintiff's property. The plaintiff filed his petition against the
18 Aaron v. Woodcock, 283 Pa. 33, 128 Atl. 665 (1925) ; Washington-Detroit
Theatre Co. v. Moore, 249 Mich. 673, 229 N. W. 618 (1930).
19 Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 128 So. 258 (1930).
20 Bauman v. Bauman, 250 N. Y. 382, 165 N. E. 819 (1929); Morecroft v.
Taylor, 225 App. Div. 562, 234 N. Y. Supp. 2 (1929).
21 [1911] 1 K. B. 410.
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Attorney-General as representing the Crown, to declare the notice
and forms illegal and ultra vires of the commissioners. The case
was heard on the motion of the defendant to strike out the petition
on the ground that it disclosed no cause of action. The question
before the court was squarely the propriety of the declaratory
judgment as a method of administrative control. In sustaining the
action Farwell, L. J., said:
". .. it would be a blot on our system of law and procedure if there is no way by which a decision on the true limit
of the power of inquisition vested in the Commissioners can be
obtained by any member of the public aggrieved, without
putting himself in the invidious position of being sued for a
penalty.
". .. If ministerial responsibility were more than the
mere shadow of a name, the matter would be less important,
but as it is, the Courts are the only defence of22 the liberty of
the subject against departmental aggression."
This case went far to increase the use of the declaratory
judgment in this field in England. It has been followed in the
colonies. It should be noted that here, again, the declaration is
negative in form, declaring an immunity or a no-duty to comply
on the part of the plaintiff who, under older forms of action, could
have raised the question only as a defendant in a suit for the
penalty. In this country the same question arises in cases where
the act complained of is also unconstitutional.
In attacking the legality of a tax assessment it is no longer
necessary to pay under protest and then sue for the return of the
tax, or in a taxpayer's suit enjoin the collection, but an action for
a declaratory may be brought by interested parties and raise the
question directly. An Indiana court holds that such a case involves
22
a real controversy and that a declaration may be made.
Under the older forms of procedure it was necessary to wait
for damage to be incurred or injury threatened in order that a
case might arise to test the constitutionality of a statute. The
action for a declaratory judgment permits the suit to be brought
at once, before damage has been done or legal liability has resulted.
The action may be brought by a public officer. Of course in each
case there must be a real controversy; a litigant cannot use thib
procedure solely for the purpose of getting legal advice. It is a
I. at 421, 424.
23 Zoercher v. Agler, 202 Ind. 214, 172 N. B. 186 (1930).
22
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safe prediction that the declaratory judgment will be frequently
used to bring the question of constitutionality before the courts at
an earlier point in the controversy than is possible under the old
procedure.
This new procedural device will thus permit the law to respond to the demands of modern life and serve as an alternate
remedy for many old problems. We are on the threshhold of a
new development in our jurisprudence.
The same narrow concept of the cause of action which I have
discussed in connection with the declaratory process has colored and
warped our concept of trial. Since no cause of action existed
until the defendant had invaded a right of the plaintiff, then the
trial assumed all the characteristics of a punitive expedition. In
carrying out this expedition the lawsuit has many of the characteristics of a military campaign. The petition may be regarded as a
piece of propaganda, not simply stating circumstances showing the
need for judicial interposition, but rather justifying the plaintiff's
demand for punishment of the defendant. We come by this warlike concept by honest inheritance, since we are not far removed
from a warlike ancestry. In the trial of a case, as in a war, we conceal weakness and disclose strength to our opponent, with an utter
disregard of truth. Until the day of trial we clamp a censorship
on our sources of information. The pleadings have long been regarded as a means of conveying information, but you and I know
that in most lawsuits the petition merely informs the defendant
that the plaintiff has accused him of being a crook and the answer
of the defendant calls the plaintiff a liar. If the true facts of the
situation were available at once, then long drawn out litigation
might be avoided and economic loss averted.
The new federal rules, having adopted a new philosophy of
pleading, also provide for wide and open discovery before trial so
that a complete disclosure of facts may be had. We have used this
in Ohio to some extent, but we have been hesitant about making the
fullest use of discovery. Our code permits us to take depositions before trial, but when we take them for purposes of discovery we call
them "fishing expeditions". We seem to be ashamed of what we
are doing. We should not have this feeling because long ago a
forward looking jurist in Ohio, William Howard Taft, held that
it was entirely proper to take the deposition of witness solely for
purposes of discovery, even though the witness would be available
at trial. Mr .Taft said:
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"It is urged that this construction of the statute will give
rise to great abuse; that a party will go fishing for evidence
among the witnesses of the opposing party, and will learn the
case of his adversary.
"To this it may first be said that it is an argument more
properly addressed to the framers of the law than to the courts
construing it. Secondly, there is likely to be no motive for
'fishing' unless the person whose deposition is sought has been
unwilling to state his knowledge upon inquiry. If a witness is
so reluctant as not to state his knowledge to a party seeking it,
the witness can not complain if the party presumes that the
knowledge thus withheld may be useful evidence to him on the
trial of the case, and that his refusal to give information indicates a desire to avoid the trial.
"Witnesses do not belong to one party more than to another. What they know relevant to the issue should be equally
available to both sides, and if they claim immunity from examination by deposition on the theory that their testimony is
one side's rather than the other's, their claim is utterly indefensible. What a witness is presumed to know is the truth and
that can not vary between the time of taking the deposition and
the trial. If there is likely to be a variance in the testimony,
the earlier a witness is committed to a statement the better for
the sake of the truth. There is no objection that I know, why
each party should not know the other's case. Each is supposed to state his case in his pleading in the beginning. By
serving notices under See. 5292 Rev. Stat., one party may compel the other to furnish a copy of such papers as he intends to
use as evidence. If such is the rule in regard to written evidence it is hard to see that it is a great objection to our construction of Sec. 5266 that it may in some cases enable a party
to take depositions which will disclose to him the evidence
which his adversary will produce....
"I have been considering the question from a standpoint of
the party. It should perhaps be considered from the standpoint of the witness. His only right infringed is the consumption of his time. I can not think that once taking his
deposition in addition to his testimony at the trial is so great a
deprivation of his rights as to warrant a court in restraining a
party from the exercise of his plain right under the statute.
It is no greater than to be called upon in two trials of the

same oase. "24

In the trial of a lawsuit we are seeking truth, not advantage
of either party, and the means to secure truth should be available
to both parties at an early stage in the litigation. It seems to me
24 Shaw v. Ohio Edison Installation Co., 9 Ohio Dec. 809 (1887).
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that in the future we shall make greater use of discovery before
trial as a means of securing the whole truth of a situation so that
a complete and adequate remedy may be administered. Why
should we fear such a complete disclosure of facts? Is not this the
scientific method?
When all facts are known, then further procedure may be
futile. The remedy may be clear without trial. Indeed, in some
cases the parties know what the outcome will be when the lawsuit
is started. It seems to me that this is true in many collection
cases; the defendant has borrowed money and has not repaid it;
or he has purchased goods and used them but has not paid the
price. No claim of failure of consideration or breach of warranty
has been made. Under our usual procedure the plaintiff sues in
usual form, the defendant denies, and trial is had. But why
should we have a trial? Each party knew all the facts. At this
point a new procedural device, the summary judgment, is applicable. Under this procedure judgment may be quickly secured
in those cases where no real defense is shown. This has been
partially accomplished under our present practice, without specific
statutory provisions, by striking sham pleadings. However, this
is difficult and is little used. It is almost never applied to pleas
of general denial.
The summary judgment has been used in England for more
than fifty years and more recently adopted in New York, New
Jersey, Michigan, Illinois, and other states. The new Federal Rules
provide for this procedure in Rule 56. In England summary
judgment was originally permitted in a restricted class of cases,
but successive reforms have greatly expanded its use. New York
permits it to be used in action to recover a debt 'or liquidated demand arising (1) on a contract, express or implied, or (2) on a
judgment for a stated sum. In England it may be used in these
cases and also in landlord and tenant cases for recovery of possession with or without rent. The federal rule. is generally applicable in all types of cases and under it there should be much interesting experimentation.
The procedure is simple; the plaintiff files his petition in the
ordinary way. He then files an affidavit that the claim is bona
fide and that the defendant has no defense. He should include
allegations of fact tending to support his conclusions and moves
for judgment. An order is issued requiring the defendant to show
cause why judgment should not enter, i. e., the defendant is re-
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quired to show his defense. This he may do by affidavit, but failing to do so, judgment will enter.
This procedure has been held constitutional where it has been
adopted. 2" The practice in New York was held applicable in the
federal courts under the Conformity Act.2"
Under the federal rule, if the hearing on the motion for summary judgment discloses that certain parts of the controversy can
be disposed of but that certain matters are controverted in good
faith, then the court may make an order limiting trial to controverted matters only. The summary judgment procedure thus supplements pretrial'procedure for simplification and clarification of
issues.
An examination of the dockets in those states where the summary judgment process is used discloses a surprisingly large number of cases disposed of by this method. Its use will increase and
spread. We must prepare ourselves for its coming.
As we look into the future and examine the judicial procedure
of tomorrow, we might see many other surprising devices, many of
which we cannot presently examine because they are based on ideas
not yet conceived. I have all too briefly discussed only three, the
future of which I can foresee. The law of the future will expand
under the declaratory judgment concept and will afford relief
where now we seek in vain. Trials will be shortened by the use
of discovery before trial and trials may even be avoided by the use
of summary judgment. The bar so equipped will render more
effective service in the world of tomorrow. We dare not meet that
world unless we too progress.
25 Dwan v. Masserone, 199 App. Div. 872, 192 N. Y. Supp. 577 (1922); General Investment Co. v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 235 N. Y. 133, 139
N. E. 216 (1928).
28 Atkinson v. Bank of Manhattan Trust Co., 69 F. (2d) 735 (C. C. A. 7th,
1934).
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